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INTRODUCTION 
The issues before the Court in this appeal are both simple and 
straightforward:1 
1. Is the exclusion clause in the Policy2 ambiguous? 
2. Does the exclusion clause exclude coverage for the Oil? 
3. Is S. W. Energy entitled to recover its attorneys' fees as a result of the 
Insurers' denial of coverage? 
The Insurers, in their Brief (the "Insurers' Brief), raise three main 
arguments, designated as Points I through III.3 Points II and III address issues 
which are not even before the Court on this appeal, and tend merely to obfuscate 
the true issues.4 Furthermore, the Insurers' argument under their Point I is based 
on fundamental misstatements of S. W. Energy's arguments and of the applicable 
law, and is not supported by the case law cited by the Insurers. 
xSee S. W. Energy Brief at 1. 
Capitalized terms used in this Reply Brief have the same meanings as defined in S. W. En-
ergy's initial Brief (the "S. W. Energy Brief). 
3These arguments are mischaracterized as "issues" at pages 1-2 of the Insurers' Brief. 
4In their "Statement of Undisputed Facts," in addition to restating the material facts already 
set forth at pages 3-6 of the S. W. Energy Brief, the Insurers also add numerous additional 
purported facts which are irrelevant to any issue before the Court on this appeal, some of 
which are simply not accurate. However, since both the existence and accuracy of these ad-
ditional "facts" are irrelevant to any issue involved in this appeal, S. W. Energy will not ad-
dress the Insurers' "Statement of Undisputed Facts" further herein. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Points II and III of the Insurers' arguments relate to issues which are 
not even before the Court, 
As described in greater detail in the S. W. Energy Brief, the Policy cov-
ered both the Tank and the Oil, and both the Tank and the Oil were lost when the 
Tank failed. The complaint below included S. W. Energy's primary claim for 
coverage for the Oil based on the plain language of the Policy, as well as alterna-
tive, secondary claims for coverage for the Oil based on theories of statutory and 
common law fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the Insur-
ers' on all counts. 
As clearly stated in the S. W. Energy Brief, in order to frame the central 
legal issues of this case clearly on appeal and to avoid clouding those issues with 
factual disputes relating to less important claims, S. W. Energy has elected not to 
pursue the secondary claims raised by the original pleadings, but is pursuing only 
its primary claim for coverage of the lost Oil, plus interest and attorneys' fees.5 
Furthermore, while S. W. Energy does not agree with the Insurers' conclusion 
about the nature of the damage to the Tank, the cost of retaining experts and 
contesting that disputed factual question would have exceeded the value of both 
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the Tank and the Oil. S. W. Energy therefore never filed a claim, either directly 
with the Insurers or in the case below, for the lost Tank. S. W. Energy does not 
now seek recovery for the Tank in this appeal, and does not dispute the Insurers' 
assertion that the damage to the Tank resulted from rust or corrosion.6 
The dispute before this Court is not the factual question whether the Tank 
rusted or corroded, but rather the legal issue whether the provision of the Policy 
that excluded coverage of the Tank (assuming rust and/or corrosion) would also 
have excluded coverage for the lost Oil. That issue must be decided based on the 
language of the Policy (resolving any ambiguities in favor of coverage), without 
deference to the trial court's decision granting summary judgment. 
S. W. Energy has expressly waived its alternative statutory and common 
law fraud theories originally asserted in the complaint, and S. W. Energy did not 
argue that the Insurers had committed fraud in the S. W. Energy Brief. Virtually 
all of the Insurers' argument under their Point II7 (that the Insurers are not guilty 
of fraud or bad faith) is irrelevant to any issue involved in this appeal, and serves 
5See S. W. Energy Brief n. 4 at 3. 
6
 See S. W. Energy Brief n. 5 at 7-8, and accompanying text. 
insurers' Brief at 29-33. 
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only to divert the time and attention of the Court and the parties away from the 
real issues of the case.8 
The Insurers' Point III9 relates entirely to whether the supplemental affida-
vit of Richard P. Smoot and the declaration of Jim Pinneo (the "Affidavits") 
should have been stricken by the trial court.10 The Affidavits were submitted in 
connection with S. W. Energy's memorandum opposing the Insurers' motion for 
summary judgment for the purpose of demonstrating the substantial factual dis-
pute over whether the hole in the bottom of the Tank had resulted from rust and 
corrosion, as argued by the Insurers, or had been caused by a broken internal 
weld, as observed by the affiants and shown by the photographs attached to the 
Affidavits. 
8The only part of the Insurers' Point II which might even arguably be relevant is Point 
11(A)(2) ("Fairly Debatable Issue"), which indirectly, at least, addresses the narrow contract 
issue of whether S. W. Energy is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees because of the Insur-
ers' breach of their implied duty of good faith under the Policy. To prevail on that claim, 
S. W. Energy does not need to prove bad faith by the Insurers - only that they denied cover-
age where coverage was not "fairly debatable." See S. W. Energy Brief at 21-22. Coverage 
is not "fairly debatable" merely because the Policy is susceptible of more than one interpre-
tation. Id. at 23-24. 
insurers' Brief at 34-38. 
10Mr. Smoot is the owner and President of S. W. Energy, and Mr. Pinneo is the field pum-
per. The Affidavits were not offered as expert testimony, but as statements of fact, based on 
the affiants' personal observations, their extensive oil field experience and their personal fa-
miliarity with the Tank. R. 208-11, 219-20. 
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As clearly stated in the S, • . Energy Brief, for practical and economic 
reasons, ° w . Energy does ' contest the Insurers' contention c. ,:^ _.al 
court . .aing that thv nole m uic iank was caused by rust or corrosion, re-
,*ivx bw viwcmea iw have stricken, or 
F... -..w \mdavits are not 
relevant tu * imnirh .,wi£t I I | >r 
rely on the Affidavits in the S. W Energy Brief I i1nr~ I, L-
ther. The admissibility of the Affidavits simply does not matter, and the Insur-
ers' entire Point III is another red herring. 
II. The Insurers' arguments are based on inaccurate or misleading state-
ments of the facts, of S. W Energy's arguments and of applicable law; 
..^arers attempt to obscure the simple, real issues behind 
length I I I 'i I I ml, ^UIULUI ., Hi ,y aiLLinpl to compound the result-
ing confusion by basin P I 
fact and law, including the following illustrative examples, Each in,! I I I I I I I IIIIIIIi i h r n 
predictably proceeds from false premise to equally faulty conclusion. 
A, Misstatement No. 1: "Plaintiff [argnes] that the conflict between 
the coverage and exclusionary clauses creates an ambiguity/5 
The Insurers introduce their argument as to the correct interpretation of the 
Policy's exclusion clause by materially mischaracterizing S. W. Energy's argu-
ment: "Plaintiff essentially argued that the conflict between the coverage and ex-
clusionary clauses creates an ambiguity. . . . [P]laintiff s entire argument suc-
ceeds or fails based on plaintiffs own presumption that the alleged conflicts be-
tween the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause create ambiguity when ap-
plied to the facts." Insurers' Brief at 20, 22. The Insurers then cite Alf v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993) ("Alf) for the proposition 
that 
'this logic would prevent application of any exclusion 
since exclusions are necessarily inconsistent with cover-
age.' . . . [S]uch a ruling 'would render any exclusion 
invalid simply because it conflicts with the stated cover-
age in some way.' 
Insurers' Brief at 22 (quoting Alf at 1275, Insurers' emphasis omitted). 
The Insurers are at least partly right: "Such a ruling" would render any 
exclusion invalid. However, S. W. Energy does not seek "such a ruling." 
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Energy does not argue that the Policy's exclusion clause is ambigu-
ous merely because it is inconsistent with the insuring clause; S. W. Energy be-
lieves that the exclusion clause is not ambiguous at all 11 More importantly, if 
it i^  because the clause itself is susceptible of 
^cause it conflicts with the insuring clause. 
I Illllii mi in in mi in iilliii in I I i ill de ally lias demon-
strated) that there is r ' usible interpretation »i hr.imi 
vors coverage.12 
B, Jlisstatement No. 2: "The plain language of the policy does not 
IIsiinguish between direct and indirect losses." 
"Tin11 lu'.'Mii.'i', 'i; /mi misconstrue the facts wl^n they state that the "plain 
languagi I ml | I ' <l I h'.lnijMii'.li IILIWLCII ducct and indirect losses." 
Insurers' Brief at 25. * o 
direct losses." Id. (emphasis added). 
The plain language of Policy belies the Insurers' argument: "This Policy 
insures against direct physical loss of or damage to the property covered." Pol-
nThe exclusion clause clearly defines the kinds of damage which are not covered, including 
rust and corrosion. Thus a claim for rust or corrosion of the Tank would be excluded. The 
exclusion clause does not, however, exclude a claim for the loss of the Oil, which was not 
rusted or corroded. See S, W, Energy Brief at 1446. 
icy, f4 (emphasis added). The exclusion clause does not "expressly limit itself 
to direct losses for the simple reason that only "direct physical losses" are cov-
ered in the first place. It would have been meaningless to have added the word 
"direct" to the exclusion clause, since indirect losses are not covered at all.13 
C. Misleading Statement No, 3: "[I]f applied only to the oil, the 
policy exclusion would be meaningless.'5 
The Insurers state, at page 26 of their brief, that, "if applied only to the 
oil, the policy exclusion would be meaningless." While that statement may be 
literally true, the Insurers' argument is disingenuous. 
The exclusion clause does not "apply only to the Oil." The Policy covers 
not only the Oil, but also the Tank and other equipment. Different kinds of 
property are susceptible to different kinds of damage. The Tank is subject to rust 
and corrosion; the Oil is not. Of course the exclusion would be meaningless "if 
applied only to the Oil." That is exactly the point. The exclusion of rust and 
corrosion damage can only apply to the kinds of insured property which are sus-
ceptible to rust and corrosion, such as the steel Tank. That the exclusion does 
12See S. W. Energy Brief at 19-20. 
13See S. W. Energy Brief at 14-16. 
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lie. u^  to other kinds of insured property whi* in ii ill mi ill! i m 11 mi in iii i 
the Oil, is not "meaningless" - it is simple common sense. 
D, Misstatement No. 4: "Plaintiff essentially asserts because its own 
reading of the policy is plausible, any differing opinion would be 
neither plausible nor fairly debatable.'5 
L-^ :W.*-J„. Clergy's argument and 
misconstiu*. — ^ i~ , j — :A 
cause its own reading of the polk niansihlr -v- - < e 
neither plausible nor fairly debatable." Insurers' Brief at 30. S. W. J1~ *r<*\ has 
made no such argument. 
Language of an insurance policy is ambiguous if it "may be understood to 
have two or more plausible meanings." iff at 1274 Ambiguous or uncertain 
langu, . trance contract that is fairly susceptible to different interpreta-
erage. It «"V Fidelity and < 
Sandt, 854 P.2d 521-2? mt*h 1QQT>- r n? 5 
P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). 
S. W. Energy has in fact presented an interpretation of the Policy which is 
not merely plausible, but compelling.14 S. W. Energy has not argued, and is not 
14See * w. Energy Brie' 
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required to show, that "any differing opinion would be neither plausible nor 
fairly debatable" - merely that its interpretation is plausible. Having met that 
burden, the Policy must be construed in favor of coverage as a matter of law, and 
the coverage cannot be "fairly debatable."15 
E, Misstatement No, 5: "[P]laintiff has failed to establish how [the 
Insurers] should have been aware that [their] analysis of the spe-
cific policy language was incorrect or unreasonable." 
Apparently recognizing that, upon analysis under governing Utah law, 
coverage for the lost Oil is, in fact, not fairly debatable, the Insurers assert that 
S. W. Energy "has failed to establish how CNA should have been aware that its 
analysis of the specific policy language was incorrect or unreasonable." Insur-
ers' Brief at 31. 
This statement is both erroneous and misleading for two reasons. First, 
S. W. Energy is not required to show that the Insurers' interpretation is unrea-
sonable - only that S. W. Energy's interpretation is plausible. 
Second, and more important, by certified letter dated April 10, 1996, 
nearly four months before filing this action, counsel for S. W. Energy, in pains-
taking detail, not only spelled out the facts underlying S. W. Energy's claim, but 
15See S. W. Energy Brief at 23-24. 
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also quoted and explained the applicable provision • I 11 I' I I ' i d 
the applicable law. R. at 184-88. The manifest falsity of the statement in the In-
surers' Brief that S. W. Energy "has failed 1 tablish how [the Insurers] should 
have been aware that [their] analysis of the specific policy language was incor-
particuiany trouoiing.
 A^t only do the Insurers admit in the same brief 
,w iw^w. * * « u^iij attached as an adden-
i , _ A Adden-
dum H. It is hard 
of good faith in analyzing S. W. Energy's claim than ' r^ -
IIL The principal case upon which the Insurers rely does not suppoi t their 
position. 
The Utah case upon which the Insurers primarily rely is Alf v. State Farm 
Fire and Cos. v^., £>0 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1AAOX '" J1^ 16 That reliance is mis-
placed 
J , ., . ... language which 
clearly and unmistakably communicate,!11. In Mir MIMII NI Mir wptvifir . i»< umslances 
under which the expected coverage will not be provirli ill ' If ]'\imn f > 
See Insurers' Brief at 21-24 
Exchange, 888 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995). 
Unlike the policy at issue in Alf, where the exclusionary language was 
precise and all-encompassing, the Policy is at least ambiguous because its 
exclusionary language is susceptible of more than one interpretation. 
Both Alf and Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 
790 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1990) {"Village Inn"), which this Court followed in 
deciding Alf, were earth movement exclusion cases where the insurer, State Farm, 
preceded the list of exclusions in its policies with a so-called "lead-in clause."17 
The lead-in clause stated: 
17In Village Inn, the court of appeals emphasized that it was State Farm's use of the lead-in 
clause which made its policy language clear and unambiguous: 
This "lead-in" clause, apparently a relatively recent addition by State Farm in its 
policies, clearly excludes from coverage any loss from earth movement, combined 
with water, regardless of cause. . . . Since the exclusion is for earth movement 
loss from any cause, we can only conclude earth movement encompasses both 
natural and human processes. In view of the lead-in language, we hold that the 
district court was correct in its interpretation that the policy was unambiguous and 
coverage was excluded under the policy as a matter of law. 
Village Inn at 583 (emphasis in the original; citations and footnote omitted). 
This Court in Alf, in reviewing the court of appeals' analysis in Village Inn, made the following 
observation: "State Farm denied coverage under a clause in the policy excluding coverage for 
damage caused, either directly or indirectly, by earth movement." Alf at 1276 (emphasis 
added). The Court in Alf, while reviewing a California federal district court's decision in 
-12-
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not 
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded 
events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of 
the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether 
other causes acted concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded 
event to produce the loss: 
Alfat 1272 n.l . In short, the lead-in clause used by State Farm had the effect of 
clearly and unmistakably communicating to the insured that there was no coverage 
for loss resulting from earth movement, regardless of the cause of the earth 
movement, whether there were other causes or "whether other causes acted 
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the loss." 
In marked contrast to the specificity and all-encompassing nature of State 
Farm's lead-in clause, here the Insurers used no lead-in clause whatsoever. State 
Farm's lead-in clause convincingly demonstrates that an insurer could use plain and 
ordinary language to clearly and unmistakably communicate to its insured that 
losses caused by corrosion or other specific causes, either directly or indirectly, 
concurrently or in sequence with other causes, are not insured. The Insurers could 
easily have eliminated any ambiguity in the Policy simply by using comparable lan-
another State Farm case, State Farm Fire & Cos. Co. v. Martin, 668 F. Supp. 1379 (CD. Cal. 
1987), affd, 872 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989)(applying California law), noted that the lead-in 
clause was again determinative: "Again, the court interpreted the explicit terms of the lead-in 
clause to deny coverage." Alfzi 1276. 
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guage. They failed to do so, and they cannot now rely on the wholly dissimilar ex-
clusionary language of Alf to compensate for that failure. 
CONCLUSION 
S. W. Energy has clearly shown, and the Insurers have failed to refute, 
that the exclusion clause in the Policy does not exclude coverage for the loss of 
the Oil. Even if the clause had been ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved 
in favor of coverage. Furthermore, since coverage is clear as a matter of law 
when the applicable rules of construction are applied, the issue of coverage is not 
"fairly debatable," and S. W. Energy is also entitled to recover its attorneys' fees 
incurred as a result of the Insurers9 denial of S. W. Energy's legitimate claim. 
Dated this 2nd day of October, 1998. 
Robert P. Hill 
John A. Adams 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Appellant S. W. Energy Cor-
poration 
429816 
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